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IN THE UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS
GENTRY GAMBLE

BRIEF OF APPELLEES

Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
DANIEL R. LARSEN and CATHERINE
J. WHEELER,

Appeal No. 970454-CA

Defendants-Appellees.

Priority No. 4

BRIEF OF APPELLEES
APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF DISMISSAL IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,
THE HONORABLE PAT B. BRIAN, PRESIDING
JURISDICTION
Appellant Gentry Gamble ("plaintiff") appeals the Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of Judge Pat B. Brian
entered on June 27, 1997, dismissing plaintiff's Complaint for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
(R. 182-87; see addendum A attached) -1 This Court has
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2 (a)-3 (2) (h) (Supp.
1996) .
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Issue No. 1: Whether the lower court properly concluded
that the clear and unequivocal language of the consent to
adoption and the adoption decree itself relinquished and

1

The relevant portions of the lower court record are cited
as (R. ). The relevant documents from the lower court record
have been included in the attached addenda.
1

terminated all of plaintiff's rights and interests in the adopted
children?
Standard of Review:

Because the lower court's finding was

based solely upon written documents, this Court may examine the
documents de novo and determine the facts.

In Re Adoption of

Infant Anonymous, 760 P.2d 916, 918 (Utah App. 1988).
Issue No. 2:

Whether the lower court properly concluded

that plaintiff's Complaint fails to state an independent cause of
action under Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to set
aside the Decree of Adoption on the basis of fraud on the court?
Standard of Review:

Because the lower court's finding was

based solely on written documents, this Court may examine the
documents de novo and determine the facts.

In Re Adoption of

Infant Anonymous, 760 P.2d 916, 918 (Utah App. 1988) .
Issue No. 3:

Whether the lower court properly dismissed the

case without ruling on whether the matter should be certified to
juvenile court?
Standard of Review: A correction of error applies to
appellate review of an issue of law.

Alvarez v. Galetka, 933

P.2d 987 (Utah 1997) .
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.15(2) (1995) provides in pertinent part:
A fraudulent representation is not a defense to strict
compliance with the requirements of this chapter, and is not
a basis for dismissal of a petition for adoption, vacation
of an adoption decree, or an automatic grant of custody to
the offended party.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.15(3) (1995) provides in pertinent part:
2

The Legislature finds no practical way to remove all risk of
fraud or misrepresentation in adoption proceedings, ... the
unmarried biological father has the primary responsibility
to protect his own rights in adoptive proceedings and that
the burden of fraud must be borne by him.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.20 (1995) provides:
A consent or relinquishment is effective when it is signed
and may not be revoked.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-9 (1990) provides in pertinent part:
The court shall examine each person appearing before it in
accordance with this chapter, separately, and, if satisfied
that the interests of the child will be promoted by the
adoption, it shall enter a final decree of adoption that the
child is adopted by the adoptive parent or parents and shall
be regarded and treated in all respects as the children of
the adoptive parent or parents.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-11 (1990) provides:
The birth parents of an adopted child are, from the time the
final decree of adoption is entered, released from all
parental duties toward and all responsibilities for the
adopted child, and have no further rights with regard to
that child.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-104 (1996) (Appellant's Brief Addendum G)
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly
discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such
terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of
justice relieve a party of his legal representative from a
final judgment, order or proceeding for the following
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due
diligence could not have been discovered in time to more for
a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or
other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) when, for any
cause, the summons in an action has not been personally
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the
defendant has failed to appear in said action; (5) the
judgment is void; (6) the judgment has been satisfied,
released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it
is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no
longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective
application; or (7) any other reason justifying relief from
3

the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1),(2),(3), or
(4), not more than 3 months after the judgement, order, or
proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this
Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment
or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the
power of a court to entertain an independent action to
relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to
set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The
procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be
by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent
action.
Rule 4-902 (1), Utah Code of Judicial Administration provides:
(1) In district court cases where there is a question
concerning the support, custody or visitation of a child and
a petition concerning abuse, dependency, or neglect of the
same child has been filed in juvenile court, the district
court shall certify the question of support, custody or
visitation to the juvenile court for determination.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Plaintiff appeals from the lower court's final appealable
order granting defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss the
Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted (R. 182-87).
Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below
Plaintiff filed a civil Complaint against defendants
Catherine Wheeler and Daniel Larsen on March 14, 1997, claiming
three causes of action: (1) an independent action for fraud on
the court pursuant to Rule 60(b) seeking to set aside a Decree of
Adoption entered on April 27, 1995; (2) an action seeking to
enforce or establish visitation rights with defendants' two
children; and (3), an action seeking to terminate defendants'
parental rights (R. 1-10).

Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss
4

for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure (R. 28-39) . Plaintiff responded by
filing a motion for an order certifying the matter to juvenile
court and for leave of court to amend the Complaint (R. 46-48) .
The proposed Amended Complaint deleted the cause of action
seeking to terminate parental rights and added a cause of action
for specific performance and breach of contract seeking ongoing
visitation rights (R. 70-80).

Meanwhile, plaintiff filed a

separate action in Third District Juvenile Court again seeking to
terminate defendants' parental rights (R. 172-74).

After

reviewing the relevant documents and conducting a hearing on the
matter, the lower court entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and an Order granting defendants' Motion to Dismiss (R. 17576, see Minute Entry attached as Addendum B; 182-87).

In sum,

the lower court ruled that plaintiff consented to the adoption,
that the Decree of Adoption terminated plaintiff's parental
rights and that plaintiff has no standing to seek visitation
rights (Id.).

The lower court further denied plaintiff's Motion

to Amend the Complaint on the basis that it does not allege any
legally enforceable contract right to visitation (Id.).

Because

the matter was dismissed, the lower court did not address
plaintiff's Motion to Certify the Case to Juvenile Court (Id.).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff and defendant Catherine Wheeler were divorced on
April 14, 1989 (R. 11-16).

Two children were born during the

marriage, Baron and Trevor Wheeler Gamble, ages 3 and 2
5

respectively at the time (R. 12, 30). Defendant Wheeler was
awarded permanent care, custody and control of the children
subject to plaintiff's reasonable rights of visitation (R. 12 at
H 2 ) . Plaintiff was further ordered to pay $200.00 per month per
child, for a total support obligation of $400.00 per month (R. 13
at H 3 ) . Plaintiff failed to maintain his court ordered child
support obligation and became seriously delinquent in his child
support payments (R. 2 at 11's 8-9).
Defendants Catherine Wheeler and Daniel Larsen were married
on March 1, 1991 (R. 71 at 1 7 ) . On February 24, 1995, defendant
Larsen filed a petition in the Third Judicial District Court
seeking to adopt the children (R. 2 at 1l0).

Plaintiff agreed to

the adoption and signed a document on March 20, 1995 entitled
"Certified Consent of Father Giving up Rights to Children
Conceived or Born Within Marriage and Waiver of Notice" (R. 4043; attached as Addendum C ) .

Thereafter, Judge J. Dennis

Frederick entered a Decree of Adoption on April 27, 1995, forever
terminating plaintiff's parental rights and duties (R. 17-18;
attached as addendum D ) .
Approximately two years later, on March 14, 1997, plaintiff
instituted the present action seeking to set aside the adoption,
or in the alternative, to establish or enforce visitation rights
(R. 1-10) .
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Two years after the adoption, plaintiff seeks to revoke his
consent and set aside the adoption decree.
6

He argues that the

concept of an open adoption should be applied retroactively in
this case, thus allowing him to retain visitation rights with the
adopted children without any related duty of support.

The lower

court correctly rejected plaintiff's attempt to rescind his
unequivocal consent to the adoption and further ruled that
adoption decree forever terminated all rights and duties of
plaintiff with regard to the adopted children.
Plaintiff further seeks to set aside the adoption decree on
the basis of fraud on the court under Rule 60(b), Utah R. Civ. P.
He claims that a letter accompanying the adoption papers
constitutes an agreement for ongoing visitation rights.

He

argues that the consent and adoption decree were fraudulent
because defendants did not submit the letter to the adoption
court.

After carefully reviewing the language of the consent and

adoption decree, the lower court accurately concluded that the
plain contract language of the adoption papers clearly and
unequivocally terminated all of plaintiff's rights and duties.
The ambiguous reference to visitation in the letter does not
create any legally enforceable right when read in conjunction
with the plain and obvious language of the accompanying adoption
papers which were acknowledged and signed by plaintiff.
Plaintiff had the responsibility to protect his own rights and
had an equal opportunity to present information to the adoption
court.

Most importantly, defendants did not prevent plaintiff

from presenting information to the adoption court and no false
representations were made by defendants to the adoption court.
7

Thus, the finality of the adoption decree must be preserved and
not set aside simply because plaintiff wants visitation rights
with the adopted children.
Finally, plaintiff seeks to undo the lower court's ruling
and to certify the matter to juvenile court.

After filing this

matter in district court, he later filed a petition in juvenile
court which he now claims has exclusive original jurisdiction.
Although the lower court did not rule on this issue below,
plaintiff's argument should be rejected for three reasons.
First, plaintiff continued to pursue this matter in the lower
court and did not voluntarily dismiss his Complaint.

Second, the

district court had jurisdiction to consider plaintiff's
independent action under Rule 60(b) seeking to set aside the
adoption decree.

The only issue before the lower court was

whether the adoption decree should be set aside, not whether
plaintiff should be awarded custody or visitation rights.
Lastly, the Utah Supreme court has recognized that a mere
allegation in a petition filed in juvenile court does not divest
the district court of jurisdiction or prove that the juvenile
court has exclusive original jurisdiction over matters of custody
or visitation.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF CONSENTED TO THE DECREE OF ADOPTION AND THE
TERMINATION OF HIS PARENTAL RIGHTS
Two years after the adoption, plaintiff sought to undo the
Decree of Adoption and to reestablish ongoing visitation rights
8

(R. 1-10).

The lower court granted defendants' Rule 12(b)(6)

Motion to Dismiss for the reason that both plaintiff's consent
and the court's Decree of Adoption clearly and unequivocally
terminated plaintiff's parental rights (R. 175-76, 182-87).

No

provision for continued visitation was made in either the consent
or the decree (Id.).
On appeal, plaintiff now suggests this Court should embrace
the concept of "open adoption" and grant him post-adoption
visitation rights.

While the concept of "open adoption" may have

some merit in evaluating the best interests of a child in the
context of an ongoing adoption proceeding, the concept has no
application in this case.
A.

THE CONSENT DID NOT PROVIDE FOR POST-ADOPTION VISITATION
RIGHTS
First, plaintiff's consent to the adoption relinquishes all

of his parental rights and duties, without reservation (R. 4042).

Plaintiff signed the document on March 20, 1995, plainly

entitled ''Certified Consent of Father Giving up Rights to
Children Conceived or Born Within Marriage and Waiver of Notice"
(emphasis added) (Id., attached as Addendum C ) .
the consent is clear and absolute.

The language of

An obvious warning appears in

bold capital letters at the top of the consent document as
follows:
DO NOT SIGN THIS DOCUMENT WITHOUT READING IT. IF YOU HAVE
ANY QUESTIONS WHATSOEVER, MAKE SURE YOU CONSULT WITH AN
ATTORNEY BEFORE SIGNING THIS DOCUMENT. BY SIGNING THIS
DOCUMENT, YOU ARE GIVING UP YOUR RIGHTS AS A PARENT. YOU
CANNOT REVOKE THE CONSENT TO YOUR CHILDREN'S ADOPTION ONCE
YOU SIGN THIS DOCUMENT.
9

(R. 4 0-42)(emphasis in original).

The document further provides

at paragraph 7 as follows:
[Plaintiff] understands that from the time the final decree
of adoption is entered, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 011 (1990, as amended), he will be released from all future
parental duties toward and all future responsibilities for
the adopted children, and have no further rights with regard
to the children.
(R. 41 at H 7)(emphasis added).

The finality of the consent was

further explained in paragraph 8 as follows:
[Plaintiff] understands that from the time the final decree
of adoption is entered, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-9
(1990, as amended), that the children will be adopted by the
petitioner and the children shall be regarded and treated in
all respects as the children of the petitioner and Catherine
Wheeler.
(Id. at H 8)(emphasis added).

The legal significance of the

consent was noted in paragraph 10 as follows: "[Plaintiff] has
had the opportunity to consult with and obtain the advice of an
attorney of his choice." (R. 42 at H 10)(emphasis added).
Paragraph 12 provides that plaintiff "consents to the granting of
a petition for adoption and consents to the adoption by
petitioner of the children." (Id. at H 12). Finally, the consent
certifies that plaintiff "has read and understands the foregoing
consent to adoption, and signs it freely and voluntarily." (Id.
at 14).

Plaintiff's claim for post-adoption visitation rights is

repudiated by his unequivocal consent to terminate his parental
rights thus allowing the adoption decree to be granted without
reservation.

10

B.

THE ADOPTION DECREE DID NOT PROVIDE FOR POST-ADOPTION
VISITATION RIGHTS
Secondly, the Decree of Adoption entered by Judge J. Dennis

Frederick on April 27, 1995, is likewise clear and unequivocal
that "all rights and interests of [plaintiff] with regard to [the
children] are hereby and forever terminated" (R. 18 at f 4)
(emphasis added).

Again, no reservation or provision is made for

a so-called "open adoption" which would allow future contact or
visitation.

The concept of an "open adoption" was never

considered by the parties, never agreed to between the parties,
never presented to Judge Frederick and not included in the
adoption decree (Id.).
C.

THE LOWER COURT DID NOT RULE ON THE CONCEPT OF "OPEN
ADOPTION"
Third, plaintiff's Complaint and proposed Amended Complaint

in the lower court do not mention the concept of an "open
adoption", much less allege a cause of action to enforce any
agreement between the parties for an "open adoption" (R. 1-10,
70-80) . Accordingly, the lower court did not rule on the
advisability of this new legal concept of open adoption in Utah
(R. 182-87).
Plaintiff raises the issue of open adoption on appeal in a
belated attempt to persuade this Court to grant post-adoption
visitation rights.

In essence, plaintiff requests this Court to

amend the Decree of Adoption more than two and one-half years
later.

This Court should reject plaintiff's invitation to adopt

such a new legal concept which was not agreed to between the
11

parties, included in the adoption decree or pled in the Complaint
reviewed by the lower court.

See State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358,

359 (Utah App. 1993) (As a general rule, appellate courts will not
consider issues raised for the first time on appeal).
D.

AN OPEN ADOPTION IS INAPPROPRIATE ABSENT THE PARTIES
AGREEMENT AND THE ADOPTION COURT'S APPROVAL
Finally, the cases and authorities referenced by plaintiff

do not support his claim that "open adoption" or "post adoption
visitation77 is appropriate in the present case.2
2

Plaintiff cites

Plaintiff cites several cases from other jurisdictions to
support his proposition that "open adoption77 should be approved
by this court and imposed in this case. A brief review of these
cases reveals that an open adoption is not a viable option in
this case.
Plaintiff's relies on Morse v. Daly, 704 P.2d 1087 (Nev.
1985), in which the Nevada Supreme Court held it was within
proper exercise of lower court's equitable powers to condition an
adoption decree upon the continued jurisdiction of the court to
consider future requests for visitation privileges by a child's
stepgrandmother. Id. at 1089. The court reasoned that such a
condition was not precluded by statute or case authority. Id.
Contrary to plaintiff's representation, the Morse court did not
affirm an open adoption decree or grant post-adoption visitation
for a natural parent. The Morse court expressly rejected an
"open adoption7' claim "because the parties have not agreed to
continuing visitation." Id. at n. 2 (emphasis added). The court
further explained that an "open adoption"
'occurs when, prior to the adoption, it is agreed in writing
that the child will have continuing contact with one or more
members of his or her biological family after the adoption
is completed... The court would approve the agreement if it
could be shown that this was in the child's best interest.
The agreement would then be incorporated into the final
order of adoption. The court would maintain jurisdiction as
in a divorce proceeding and could modify the agreement if
necessary for the child's welfare.'
Id. (quoting Amadio & Deutsch, Open Adoption; Allowing Adopted
Children to "Stay in Touch" With Blood Relatives, 22 J.Fam.L. 59,
60061 (1983) (footnote omitted in original, emphasis added)).
In the present case, the parties did not enter into a
written agreement for an open adoption, the court did not approve
or incorporate such an agreement into the Decree of Adoption, and
the court did not maintain jurisdiction to modify the Decree of
12

a Utah case where the foster parents sought to adopt an Indian
child who had been living with them outside the reservation.

In

the Matter of Adoption of Holloway, 732 P.2d 962 n. 11 (Utah
1986).

Having found that the Indian courts had exclusive

jurisdiction over the matter, Justice Zimmerman dropped a
footnote suggesting that an innovative approach to adoption,
called an "open adoption", may be suited to the facts of the
case.

Id.

Justice Zimmerman did not mention post-adoption

visitation, but merely explained that the fundamental concept of
an open adoption is to allow some communication between the
adoptive and natural parents and, when appropriate, to permit
communication between the natural parent and the child as the
child grows up.

Id.

He suggested that the child could remain

with his adoptive parents, but also allow the tribe to teach the
child about his Indian heritage.

Id.

Justice Zimmerman

Adoption. Because an open adoption did not occur, this Court
should reject plaintiff's attempt to modify the Decree of
Adoption by creating new law in Utah.
The Utah cases cited by plaintiff are also inapplicable. See
Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64, 68 (Utah 1978)(Remanding divorce
action to trial court to determine whether the stepparent stands
in loco parentis to his stepchild, whether it is in child's best
interest to allow stepparent a right of visitation, and whether
visitation rights should be conditioned upon stepparents
agreement to pay a proper share of child support); Workman v.
Workman, 498 P.2d 1384, 1386 (Okla. 1972)(Because stepfather
assumed status and obligation in loco parentis, two deceased
children could not maintain wrongful death action against
stepfather for negligent operation of a vehicle); State of Utah
In Re J.W.F., 799 P.2d 710 (Utah 1990) (In a case where the
natural mother's parental rights had been terminated, her husband
had standing to seek custody of a child born into his marriage,
although the child was not his biological offspring, since
husband was child's stepparent and husband had legal obligation
of support prior to dissolution of marriage).
13

cautioned that his comment was merely an observation and
recognized that it was not the court's matter to decide on
appeal.

Id.

Unlike the circumstances in Holloway, the adoption in the
present case was finalized more than two and a half years ago.
Judge Frederick was required by statute to determine whether the
adoption was in "the best interest [s] of the [children]."
Code Ann. § 78-30-1.5 (1990).

Utah

Plaintiff's unequivocal consent to

the adoption represents his agreement with Judge Frederick that
it was in the best interests of the children that his parental
rights be terminated and that he be released from "all future
parental duties toward and all future responsibilities for the
adopted children, and have no further rights with regard to the
children."

(R. 40 at 1 7 ) . Plaintiff further represented and

agreed that it was in the best interests of the children to be
adopted by defendant Larsen and that "the children shall be
regarded and treated in all respects as the children of [Mr.
Larsen] and Catherine Wheeler."

(R. 40 at 1 8 ) .

Nowhere in the adoption proceedings before Judge Frederick
did plaintiff seek to preserve any parental rights or visitation
privileges.

The final entry of the Decree of Adoption on April

27, 1995, precludes plaintiff's attempt to obtain an "open
adoption" or to establish post-adoption visitation.

Because the

concept of open adoption was never agreed to between the parties,
much less considered or ruled upon by the lower court, this court
need not consider the applicability of open adoption in this
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appeal.3

To rule otherwise would disrupt the finality of any

adoption decree in Utah and subject adoptive parents to the
unwanted risk of having their adoption set aside or reviewed for
application of the open adoption concept.
POINT II
THE ADOPTION DOCUMENTS ARE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL THAT
PLAINTIFF'S PARENTAL RIGHTS WERE FOREVER TERMINATED
A.

THE COMPLAINT DOES NOT ALLEGE A FRAUD UPON THE COURT
Plaintiff's attempt to set aside the adoption decree is

premised upon the language in Rule 60 (b), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, which provides as follows: "This rule does not limit
the power of a court to entertain an independent action to
relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set
aside a judgment for fraud upon the court."

3

The Utah Supreme

Notably, plaintiff did not timely file a motion before
Judge Frederick seeking to challenge or set aside the adoption
decree under Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. A motion
under Rule 60(b) "shall be made within a reasonable time and for
reasons (1),(2),(3), or (4), not more than 3 months after the
judgement, order, or proceeding was entered or taken." Id. In
Maertz v. Maertz, 827 P.2d 259, 262 (Utah App. 1992), this Court
held that a plaintiff's action to set aside an adoption decree,
brought three and one-half years after the adoption order was
granted, was not brought with a "reasonable time" under Rule
60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This Court explained
that what constitutes a reasonable time depends upon the fact of
each case, considering such factors as the interest in finality,
the reason for delay, the practical ability of the litigant to
learn earlier of the grounds relied upon, and prejudice to the
other parties, Id. at 261, (citing, Ashford v. Steuart, 657 F.2d
1053, 1055 (9th Cir. 1981).
Instead, this case arises out of an independent action under
Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in which plaintiff
seeks relief from Judge Frederick's adoption decree. Therefore,
the only issue on appeal is whether the lower court properly
denied plaintiff's attempt to set aside the adoption decree, not
whether an open adoption should be granted in the adoption case.
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Court recognized such independent actions in St. Pierre v.
Edmonds, 645 P.2d 615 (Utah 1982).

In St. Pierre, an ex-wife

sought to set aside the property distribution in a divorce decree
on the basis of duress.

The court held that Rule 60(b) expressly

preserves a court's power to entertain an independent action to
relieve a party from a judgment or decree on the ground it was
obtained by fraud.

To justify setting aside a divorce decree,

the court defined fraud as

u

[a]n intentional act by a party in a

divorce action which prevents the opposing party from making a
full defense....''

Id. at 619.4

The court ruled that the alleged

use of harassment, threats of bodily harm, physical abuse and
intimidation forcing plaintiff to sign the divorce settlement
documents was sufficient to state a claim for duress.
In the present case, plaintiff's Complaint alleges that the
adoption decree was based upon fraud and should therefore be set
aside.

Unlike the plaintiff in St. Pierre, he does not allege

4

"Fraud upon the court" has been further defined by the
United States Supreme Court as "a wrong against the institutions
set up to protect and safeguard the public, institutions in which
fraud cannot complacently be tolerated consistently with the good
order of society." Hazel-Atlas Glass Company v. Hartford Empire
Co., 322 U.S. 238, 246 (1944). Such fraud has also been
described as fraud that "does or attempts to subvert the
integrity of the court itself or that is perpetrated by officers
of the court so that the judicial machinery cannot perform in the
usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that are
presented for adjudication." Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal
Practice & Procedure, Civ.2d § 2870. Examples of fraud upon the
court include bribery of a judge, or counsel engaging in a
conspiracy to produce fabricated evidence. No such fraud is
alleged in plaintiff's Complaint.
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fraud by duress.5

Instead, he claims that the consent for

adoption was based upon the condition that he could continue
visitation with the adopted children.

In other words, he

maintains that the consent and adoption decree do not accurately
reflect his agreement and understanding.

Thus, this case hinges

upon the question of whether plaintiff is bound by the explicit
terms of the consent and the adoption decree.
B.

AN ADOPTION AGREEMENT IS INTERPRETED UNDER PRINCIPLES OF
CONTRACT LAW
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that an agreement to

adopt is considered a contract.
223, 228 (Utah 1953).

In Re Adoption of D, 252 P.2d

A parent's consent to adoption, once

voluntarily given, and acted upon by the adopting parents, cannot
be withdrawn without good cause.

Id.

After acceptance, such "a

contract is enforceable against the adopting parents and ought to
be enforceable by them."

Id. at 22 9; see also In Re Adoption of

K, 465 P.2d 541, 543 (Utah 1970)("Agreements of adoption are
merely contractual arrangements and are entitled to be enforced
the same as are all other types of contract except as the welfare
of the child might otherwise require.).

In addition, the

doctrine of estoppel,6 and other principles of equity, "would
5

While plaintiff asserts that threats of civil and
criminal penalties for child non-support was a factor, he does
not assert that his consent was involuntary. Nor does he claim
that he was induced to sign the consent by use of harassment,
threats of bodily harm, physical abuse or intimidation as was the
case in St. Pierre.
6

Although not presented to the lower court, this Court
should find that plaintiff is barred by the doctrine of judicial
estoppel from disputing the clear language in his Certified
17

preclude a court from assisting appellant to regain the custody
of the child.7'

Id.

The Utah legislature has likewise determined that a consent
to adoption becomes an irrevocable contract at the moment it is
signed.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.20 (1995), provides that an

adoption "consent or relinquishment is effective when it is
signed and may not be revoked."7

Utah law further provides that

Consent to the effect that he understood and voluntarily
relinquished all rights and duties regarding the adopted
children. Weber v. Snvderville West, 800 P.2d 316, 320 (Utah
App. 1990), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991)(Appellate
court may affirm the lower court on any proper ground). The
principle of judicial estoppel prevents a party from seeking
relief by contradicting his own sworn statements in a judicial
proceeding. See Weise v. Weise, 699 P.2d 704 (Utah 1985) (Durham,
J. dissenting). Judicial estoppel is based upon a strong and
independent public policy, namely, the need to uphold the
sanctity of oaths and the integrity of the judicial process. See
Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline, 913 p.2d 731, 734 (Utah
1995), (citing Weise v. Weise, 699 P.2d at 704-05 (Durham,
J.,dissenting)). Unlike equitable estoppel, judicial estoppel
does not require prejudice to the adverse party. Weise, 699 P.2d
at 705. This principle was discussed in an analogous case where
Justice Durham wrote that a party should be judicially estopped
from contesting paternity after the party signed a divorce
stipulation and agreement representing that he was the father of
the child. Id. at 706. Likewise, plaintiff should be judicially
estopped from contesting the adoption decree after he signed the
Certified Consent representing that he relinquished all parental
rights.
7

This Court has previously noted that the Utah Legislature
enacted a new adoption act in 1995 recognizing that there is V M no
practical way to remove all risk of fraud or misrepresentation in
adoption proceedings.'" Matter of Adoption of W, 904 P.2d 1113
n. 9 (Utah App. 1995)(quoting, Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.15(3)
(1995). As a matter of public policy, the legislature determined
that an unmarried biological father has the primary
responsibility to protect his own rights in adoptive proceedings
and that the burden of fraud must be borne by him. Id. Under
the new adoption statute, a fraudulent representation is not a
basis to set aside an adoption decree. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 04.15 (2) (1995)
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after an adoption decree is entered by a court, the birth
parent's rights are completely terminated.

See Utah Code Ann. §

78-30-11 ("The birth parents of an adopted child are, from the
time the final decree of adoption is entered, released from all
parental duties toward and all responsibilities for the adopted
child, and have no further rights with regard to that child.").
These statutory provisions are consistent with Utah case law
recognizing a strong need for finality regarding the adoption of
children establishing new family relationships.8
Recognizing that plaintiff's consent to the adoption was a
contract, the lower court analyzed the Certified Consent and
Decree of Adoption under principles of contract law (R 185). When
a court is asked to interpret a contract, it must first look to
the four corners of the agreement to determine the intentions of
the parties.

Ron Case Roofing v. Bloomquist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1385

(Utah 1989).

It is a basic rule of contract interpretation that

the intent of the parties is to be determined from the writing
itself, with each provision being considered in relation to all
others.

Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands &

Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990) . The plain meaning rule
applies to preserve the intent of the parties and to protect the

8

See Maertz v. Maertz, 827 P.2d 259 (Utah App. 1992) ("[F]rom
strictly a humanitarian standpoint, there must be an end to the
emotional stress and strain that is involved in the natural
parents' attempt to regain custody of a child. The strain is
particularly acute to the adoptive child itself, who may have
established strong bonds of affection and love for the adoptive
parents, and to the adoptive parents who must suffer the spectre
of losing their child.");
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agreement from judicial revision.

Hal Taylor Assocs. v.

Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 749 (Utah 1982).

When the

meaning of a contract is clear and unambiguous, extrinsic
evidence is generally not admissible to explain the intent of the
parties and a court may interpret the contract as a matter of
law. Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands & Forestry,
802 P.2d at 725; Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292, 1293
(Utah 1983).

To be ambiguous, both parties' interpretations must

be contrary and both must be tenable.

See, e.g.. Grow v. Marwick

Dev., Inc., 621 P.2d 1249, 1252 (Utah 1980).
C.

THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY INTERPRETED THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF
THE CONSENT AND ADOPTION DECREE
In the present case, the lower court carefully reviewed the

language of the consent and the adoption decree (R. 182).

In its

findings of fact, the court noted the following language:
3. The Certified Consent provides a warning at the top of
the document as follows:
DO NOT SIGN THIS DOCUMENT WITHOUT READING IT. IF YOU
HAVE ANY QUESTIONS WHATSOEVER, MAKE SURE YOU CONSULT
WITH AN ATTORNEY BEFORE SIGNING THIS DOCUMENT. BY
SIGNING THIS DOCUMENT, YOU ARE GIVING UP YOUR RIGHTS AS
A PARENT. YOU CANNOT REVOKE THE CONSENT TO YOUR
CHILDREN'S ADOPTION ONCE YOU SIGN THIS DOCUMENT.
4. Paragraph 7 of the Certified Consent provides:
[Plaintiff] understands that from the time the final
decree of adoption is entered, pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-30-11 (1990, as amended), he will be released
from all future parental duties toward and all future
responsibilities for the adopted children, and have no
further rights with regard to the children.
5. Paragraph 8 of the Certified Consent of Father provides:
[Plaintiff] understands that from the time the final
decree of adoption is entered, pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-30-9 (1990, as amended), that the children
will be adopted by the petitioner and the children
shall be regarded and treated in all respects as the
children of the petitioner and Catherine Wheeler.
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6. Paragraph 10 of the Certified Consent of Father
provides:
[Plaintiff] has had the opportunity to consult with and
obtain the advice of an attorney of his choice."
7. The Decree of Adoption entered on April 27, 1995 by the
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick provides, at paragraph 4: "All
rights and interests of Gentry Gamble with regard to Trevor
and Baron are hereby and forever terminated."
(R. 183-84).

Based upon this language, the lower court concluded

as a matter of law that "the language of the Certified and Decree
of Adoption is clear and unequivocal.

Plaintiff Gentry Gamble

understood and agreed to relinquish all rights to the adopted
children." (R. 185). The court further concluded that after the
Decree of Adoption was granted on April 27, 1995, "all rights and
interests of plaintiff with regard to these children were forever
terminated." (Id.).
D.

THE LETTER DOES NOT CREATE AN ENFORCEABLE RIGHT TO POSTADOPTION VISITATION
The only evidence offered by plaintiff to refute the clear

language of the consent was a letter from the law firm of Cohne,
Rappaport & Segal which says among other things, "You may
maintain the present visitation schedule with Trevor and Baron."
The lower court found that when read in conjunction with the
clear and unequivocal language of the Certified Consent and the
Decree of Adoption, "the referenced letter does not create in
plaintiff any legally enforceable right with regard to the
adopted children." (Id. at % 3).

The court further explained

that in light of the specific language of the accompanying
adoption papers, the brief and ambiguous reference to visitation
in the midst of the attorney's cover letter was not a contract
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between the parties for post-adoption visitation (R. 185 at H 4 ) .
As a practical matter, the court noted that the letter "does not
define the visitation schedule, explain how the visitation
schedule could be modified, provide an enforcement mechanism or
preclude the defendants from terminating the visitation
schedule." (R. Id.). Therefore, the court concluded that the
defendants, as the parents of the children, could "terminate any
contact between their children and plaintiff." (Id.). 9
While the lower court's findings with regard to the language
of the consent and the adoption decree may be reviewed by this
Court de novo, the plain language of these adoption documents is
not disputed by plaintiff.

Nor are these documents subject to

any other reasonable interpretation.

9

The only reasonable

After the adoption, defendants did permit their children
to have contact with plaintiff, although it was not regular
contact and it was not under the terms of any agreement. They
reasoned that if the children desired some contact, and such
contact was not harmful to the children, they would allow
plaintiff to maintain contact as they deemed fit. Plaintiff
falsely reported abuse by defendants in an apparent attempt to
obtain custody or visitation. Plaintiff's report was
investigated, determined to be unfounded and no juvenile court
proceeding was instituted. Due to plaintiff's conduct,
defendants determined that it was harmful to their family
relationship to allow plaintiff any further contact. The
children resent plaintiff's attempt to destroy their family
relationship and no longer desire any further contact with
plaintiff. As the childrens' sole parents, defendants have the
right to make decisions regarding their children, including the
decision whether their children should be permitted to spend
weekends, holidays and special occasions in another person's
home. They also have the related duties as parents to provide
financial support, shelter, food, education, clothing etc. After
all, that was the primary purpose of the adoption, to establish
and maintain a single home with two loving parents that had
already demonstrated their responsibility for properly supporting
and raising their children.
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interpretations from these documents are that; (1) plaintiff
voluntarily relinquished his parental rights, (2) the adoption
court accepted the consent, (3) the adoption court found that the
adoption was in the best interest of the children, and (4)
plaintiff's parental rights were terminated forever.

After the

adoption was final, plaintiff had no further rights to visitation
pursuant to any statute, court order or contractual agreement.
Plaintiff now argues that he would not have consented to the
adoption if he had known that he would no longer enjoy his
parental rights (see plaintiff's brief at p. 25). Incredibly, he
claims it was his understanding that his consent to adoption
provided him the best of both worlds, i.e., he retained his
parental rights to visitation but was relieved from his parental
duties of support.10

Despite that fact that plaintiff read,

understood and signed the consent, he claims that he had no
control over the information provided to Judge Frederick prior to
the adoption (Id.).

Because defendants did not submit the above

referenced attorney's letter to the adoption court, he claims
that a fraud was perpetrated upon the court.

Had the letter been

disclosed to Judge Frederick, he asserts that the adoption would
not have been granted.

10

Defendants would not have petitioned for the adoption if
plaintiff were allowed to retain his visitation rights, yet
escape his court ordered child support duty, a duty he had
already breached.
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E.

NO FRAUDULENT REPRESENTATIONS WERE MADE TO THE ADOPTION
COURT
Plaintiff's claims and arguments are disingenuous.

He had

an equal opportunity to offer any information to the adoption
court.

After all, he was a necessary party to the adoption case.

As a party, the only information he offered to the adoption court
was his signed consent.

After reading the consent, and having

had an opportunity to seek the advice of counsel, plaintiff could
have simply refused to sign the consent document.

He could also

have demanded that the consent document be redrafted by
defendants to clearly preserve his purported understanding that
he retained post-adoption visitation rights.

Instead, he signed

the document which clearly relinquishes all parental rights, he
did not offer any other information to the adoption court, he did
not contest the adoption, and he did not seek to undo the
adoption until two years later.11
Under these facts, it would be a stretch of contract
jurisprudence to infer an entire open adoption agreement into a
single, gratuitous ambiguous sentence in an attorney's letter
which was accompanied by the Petition for Adoption and the clear
and unequivocal Consent for Adoption (R. 19).

In sum, no

contract for visitation was entered into between the parties.
11

See In the Matter of Baby Boy Doe, 894 P.2d 1285 (Utah
App. 1995)(Where a mother signed a consent to adoption, she could
not later revoke her consent after that date); In Re Adoption of
Maestas, 531 P.2d 492 (Utah 1975)(Where the evidence fully
justified the trial court in concluding that a mother's consent
had been given willingly, knowingly and voluntarily, the
appellate court should not reverse the trial court in that
regard).
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The only agreement between the parties was the consent for
adoption which forever terminated plaintiff's visitation rights.
Most importantly, defendants made no fraudulent
representations to the adoption court and plaintiff was not
forced to sign the consent under duress.12

Unlike the divorce

case in St. Pierre v. Edmonds, 645 P.2d at 619, defendants did
not engage in any intentional conduct which prevented plaintiff
"from making a full defense" in the adoption matter.

To the

contrary, plaintiff had every opportunity to participate in the
adoption proceedings, obtain legal advice regarding his parental
rights and assure that the consent document fully embodied his
understanding with regard to his future rights.

Plaintiff was

sufficiently warned that if he signed the consent document, he
was giving up his rights as a parent and he could not revoke his
consent later (R. 40). Under these circumstances, this Court
should affirm the lower court's ruling that plaintiff's Complaint
and proposed Amended Complaint fail to state a claim to support
an independent action to set aside the adoption decree for fraud
upon the court.

12

The only fraud being perpetrated in this case is
plaintiff's claim that he somehow retained his parental rights
after he; (1) failed to support his children for years; (2)
consented to adoption in order to avoid his child support
obligation; (3) signed a plainly worded consent document that
relinquished his parental rights; (4) failed to contest the
adoption or present any further evidence; (5) and nullified the
terms of visitation and support in the divorce decree.
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POINT III
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN DECLINING TO RULE ON
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO CERTIFY THE CASE TO JUVENILE COURT
Plaintiff argues that the lower court should have certified
the entire case to the juvenile court after he filed a separate
petition to terminate defendants' parental rights in juvenile
court.

He relies upon Rule 4-902, Utah Code of Judicial

Administration and Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 (a)-17 (1953 as amended)
which generally require that a district court should certify to
the juvenile court questions concerning child support, custody or
visitation where a petition has been filed in the juvenile court
concerning abuse, dependency or neglect.

Plaintiff's argument

should be rejected for three reasons.
First, after filing his petition in juvenile court,
plaintiff could have voluntarily dismissed his Complaint in
district court under Rule 41(a) (1), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Instead, plaintiff sought leave to file an Amended

Complaint and continued to pursue his action in district court.
In other words, plaintiff chose to seek relief in both courts.
Second, the district court case before Judge Brian did not
involve a question concerning the support, custody or visitation
of a child.

As discussed above, plaintiff filed an independent

action under Rule 60 (b) to set aside the adoption decree.

The

only question before the district court was whether the adoption
decree should be set aside, not whether plaintiff should be
awarded custody or visitation.

This court has noted that even if
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a natural parent brings uan independent action against the
adoptive parents for alleged fraud or misrepresentation, it is
unclear what remedy [he] could pursue.

Even were [he] to prevail

on such an action, [he] has no clear right to reinstatement of
[his] parental rights or to otherwise undo the adoption" In the
Matter of Baby Bov Doe, 894 P.2d 1285, 1288 n. 6 (Utah App.
1995) .
Finally, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized that the
juvenile court was created by statute and only has jurisdiction
in those cases specified therein.

In Re State in Interest of

Valdez, 504 P.2d 1372, 1374 (Utah 1973).

In rejecting a similar

claim, the court explained that a mere allegation in a petition
that a parent is unfit does not prove that fact, nor does it
prove that a child is uneglected", nor does it prove that the
juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction with respect
to custody.

Id. at 1374-75, (citing In Re O'Hare's Guardianship,

9 Utah 2d 156, 427 (1959).

Where the juvenile court's findings

were insufficient to establish neglect, the matter was determined
to be a conventional custody dispute between maternal and
paternal relatives and was within the jurisdiction of the
district court.
In the present case, plaintiff elected to file his lawsuit
in district court.

After defendants filed a motion to dismiss,

plaintiff instituted a second action in juvenile court.

Whether

plaintiff was court shopping, judge shopping or simply trying to
attack the adoption decree in two courts, the district court had
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jurisdiction to consider plaintiff's independent action under
Rule 60(b).

Plaintiff should not be permitted to undo Judge

Brian's ruling simply because he does not like the outcome of his
lawsuit.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, defendants respectfully request this
Court to affirm the lower court's grant of defendants' motion to
dismiss plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted.

Defendants further request this

Court to award costs and attorney fees to defendants on appeal.
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
Defendants request oral argument.

Oral argument will

materially assist the Court in understanding the procedural
context, factual background and relevant law for the issues
presented.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / "T

day of December, 1997.
?

'wiaiAM W. DOr — ' K'1-^
Attorney for defendants/appellees
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that I served by First Class Mail two copies of
the BRIEF OF APPELLEES

this

\f

day of December, 1997, to the

following:
Frederick N. Green
GREEN Sc BERRY
622 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

William W. Downes, Jr. (#0907)
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C.
175 West 200 South, Suite 4000
Post Office Box 2668
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668
Telephone: (801) 322-2222

* T •"
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Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GENTRY GAMBLE,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

vs.
DANIEL R. LARSEN and
CATHERINE J. WHEELER,

Civil No. 970901796
Judge Pat B. Brian

Defendants.

The above-captioned matter came before the court on the
9th day of May, 1997 before the Honorable Pat B. Brian, plaintiff appearing in person and through counsel, Frederick N.
Green, and defendants appearing in person and through counsel,
William W. Downes, Jr.

The court reviewed plaintiff's Com-

plaint, the Certified Consent of Father Giving up Rights to
Children Conceived Within Marriage and the Decree of Adoption.
Based thereon, and for good cause appearing, the court hereby
enters its:

Ofl'om

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On February 24, 1995, Daniel R. Larsen filed a

Petition in the Third Judicial District Court to adopt Trevor
Wheeler Gamble and Baron Wheeler Gamble, the natural children
of his spouse, Catherine J. Wheeler.

In the Matter of the

Adoption of Trevor B. Wheeler Gamble and Baron 6. Wheeler
Gamble. Third District Court Case No. 952900102AD (Judge J.
Dennis Frederick).
2.

On March 20, 1995, Gentry Gamble, the chiidrens*

natural father, signed the Certified Consent of Father Giving
up Rights to Children Conceived Within Marriage and Waiver of
Notice.
3.

The Certified Consent provides a warning at the top

of the document as follows:
DO NOT SIGN THIS DOCUMENT WITHOUT READING IT. IF YOU
HAVE ANY QUESTIONS WHATSOEVER, MAKE SURE YOU CONSULT
WITH AN ATTORNEY BEFORE SIGNING THIS DOCUMENT. BY
SIGNING THIS DOCUMENT, YOU ARE GIVING UP YOUR RIGHTS
AS A PARENT. YOU CANNOT REVOKE THE CONSENT TO YOUR
CHILDREN'S ADOPTION ONCE YOU SIGN THIS DOCUMENT.
4.

Paragraph 7 of the Certified Consent provides:

[Plaintiff] understands that from the time the final
decree of adoption is entered, pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. Section 78-30-11 (1990, as amended), he will be
released from all future parental duties toward and
all future responsibilities for the adopted children,
and have no further rights with regard to the children.
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5.

Paragraph 8 of the Certified Consent of Father

provides:
[Plaintiff] understands that from the time the final
decree of adoption is entered, pursuant to Utah Code
Ann, Section 78-30-9 (1990, as amended), that the
children will be adopted by the petitioner and the
children shall be regarded and treated in all
respects as the children of the petitioner and
Catherine Wheeler.
6.

Paragraph 10 of the Certified Consent of Father

provides:
[Plaintiff] has had the opportunity to consult with
and obtain the advice of an attorney of his choice.
7.

The Decree of Adoption entered on April 27, 1995 by

the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick provides, at paragraph 4:
"All rights and interests of Gentry Gamble with regard to
Trevor and Baron are hereby and forever terminated."
8.

Plaintiff's Complaint references a letter from the

law firm of Cohne, Rappaport & Segal to plaintiff wherein
plaintiff was advised:

"You may maintain the present visita-

tion schedule with Trevor and Baron."
9.

The Complaint does not reference, nor did plaintiff

present at oral argument, any other documents to further
establish or define any ongoing visitation agreement between
the parties.
10.

Plaintiff sought leave of court to file an Amended

Verified Complaint alleging an additional cause of action
styled as "Specific Performance and Breach of Contract."
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Plaintiff alleges the existence of contractual visitation
rights that have been breached by the defendants.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court
hereby makes and enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Under principles of contract law, the language of the

Certified Consent and the Decree of Adoption is clear and
unequivocal.

Plaintiff Gentry Gamble understood and agreed to

relinquish all rights to the adopted children.
2.

Pursuant to the Decree of Adoption granted on April

27, 1995, all rights and interests of plaintiff with regard to
these children were forever terminated.
3.

When read in conjunction with the clear and unequivo-

cal language of the Certified Consent and Decree of Adoption,
the referenced letter does not create in plaintiff any legally
enforceable right with regard to the adopted children.
4.

The visitation language in the attorney's letter is

insufficient in light of the adoption papers to create a
contract for post-adoption visitation.

The attorneys letter

does not define the visitation schedule, explain how the
visitation schedule could be modified, provide an enforcement
mechanism or preclude the defendants from terminating the
visitation schedule.
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5.

As the natural parents of these children pursuant to

the Decree of Adoption, defendants may terminate any contact
between their children and plaintiff.
6.

Plaintiff's First Cause of Action seeking to set

aside the Decree of Adoption pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure should be dismissed with prejudice for
failing to state a cause of action upon which relief may be
granted.
7.

Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action seeking to enforce

or establish visitation with defendants' children should be
dismissed with prejudice.

In light of Judge Frederick's

termination of plaintiff's parental rights with these children,
plaintiff lacks standing to seek or enforce visitation rights
after the Decree of Adoption became final on April 27, 1995.
8.

Plaintiff's Third Cause of Action seeking to termi-

nate defendants' parental rights pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
Section 78-3(a)-401, et. seq.. should be dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.

The juvenile courts of this state

have exclusive original jurisdiction over such actions.
9.

Plaintiff's motion to amend the Complaint should be

denied as futile since the Amended Complaint likewise fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted for the reasons
stated above.
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ORDER
Based upon the above Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss the Complaint is

granted.
2.

Plaintiff's Motion to Amend the ComplainJ; is denied.

3.

Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.

DATED this £) ?

day of _^\> &s&',J ^» , 1997.
Y THE COURT:

Pat B. Brian,
Approved as to form:
GREEN & BERRY

^^derick^N. Green
Attorney for Plaintiff
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ADDENDUM B

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
GAMBLE, GENTRY
PLAINTIFF

vs
LARSEN, DANIEL R

CASE NUMBER 970901796 CV
DATE 05/09/97
HONORABLE PAT B BRIAN
COURT REPORTER (NOT REPORTED)
COURT CLERK BHY

DEFENDANT
TYPE OF HEARING:
MOTION TO DISMISS
PRESENT: PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT
P. ATTY. GREEN, FREDERICK N
D. ATTY. DOWNES, WILLIAM W

THIS MATTER IS BEFORE THE COURT FOR HEARING RE: DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS. BOTH PARTIES ARE PRESENT WITH COUNSEL, AS
SHOWN ABOVE. THE COURT HEARS ARGUMENT FROM BOTH COUNSEL.
THE COURT FINDS THAT THE NATURAL FATHER SIGNED A CONSENT TO
ADOPTION ON 3/20/95. THE CONSENT CLEARLY STATED ON ITS FACE
THAT ALL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NATURAL FATHER WERE
PERMANANTLY TERMINATED. THE DECREE OF ADOPTION ALSO CLEARLY
THE COURT FINDS THAT THERE WAS AN AGREEMENT RE: RELEASE BY
NATURAL MOTHER OF ALL CLAIMS FOR CHILD SUPPORT ARREARAGES AND
ONGOING CHILD SUPPORT, IN EXCHANGE FOR NATURAL FATHER'S SIGNING
OF THE CONSENT TO ADOPTION.
THE COURT FINDS THERE IS ONE LETTER IN EVIDENCE BEFORE THE
COURT TODAY THAT CONTAINS A BRIEF REFERENCE TO VISITATION FOR
THE NATURAL FATHER- THE COURT FINDS THAT THIS IS TOO VAGUE FOR
THE COURT TO ENFORCE.
THE COURT FINDS THAT THE PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FAILS TO
STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED. THE DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS (RELATING TO ALL THREE CAUSES OF ACTION) IS
GRANTED. THE PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT IS DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT IS DENIED.

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS IS TO PREPARE THE FINDINGS AND ORDER
FROM TODAY'S HEARING AND DELIEVER A COPY TO OPPOSING COUNSEL FOR
APPROVAL AS TO FORM, AND SUBMIT THEM TO THE COURT BY 5/23/97.
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ADDENDUM C

Kevin J. Fife (Bar No. 5962)
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL P.C.
Attorneys for Petitioner
525 East First South, Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
Telephone (801) 532-2666
Facsimile (801) 355-1813

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF
THE ADOPTION OF:
TREVOR B. WHEELER GAMBLE and
BARON G. WHEELER GAMBLE,

CERTIFIED CONSENT OF FATHER
GIVING UP RIGHTS TO
CHILDREN CONCEIVED OR BORN
WITHIN MARRIAGE AND WAIVER
OF NOTICE

minor children.
Probate No. 952900102AD
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

DO NOT SIGN THIS DOCUMENT WITHOUT READING IT. D7 YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS
WHATSOEVER, MAKE SURE YOU CONSULT WITH AN ATTORNEY BEFORE SIGNING
THIS DOCUMENT. BY SIGNING THIS DOCUMENT, YOU ARE GIVING UP YOUR RIGHTS
AS A PARENT. YOU CANNOT REVOKE THE CONSENT TO YOUR CHILDREN'S
ADOPTION ONCE YOU SIGN THIS DOCUMENT.
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

:ss.

Gentry Gamble, being first duly sworn upon oath, or affirmation, deposes and states as
follows:
1.

He was born on September 19, 1957 at Bethesda, Maryland.
ii

EXHIBIT.

ftflOO**

2.

He is the biological father of the minor children sought to be adopted, to wit:

Trevor B. Wheeler Gamble, who was born on the February 10, 1987, Baron G. Wheeler
Gamble, who was born on July 24, 1985.
3.

He understands that a verified petition for adoption of the minor children has been

filed and that pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.7 (1990, as amended). He must respond
to the petition within thirty (30) days of service if he intends to contest the adoption, and hereby
waives all notices pursuant to that section.
4.

He is not under the influence of alcohol, drugs, medication, or any impairment

of ability to understand and appreciate the significance of giving his consent to adoption.
5.

He signs this consent freely and voluntarily and not under any duress, coercion,

or force,
6.

He understands that pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.3 (1990, as amended),

his consent to adoption is effective when signed and may not be revoked.
7.

He understands that from the time the final decree of adoption is entered, pursuant

to Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-11 (1990, as amended), he will be released from all future parental
duties toward and all future responsibilities for the adopted children, and have no further rights
with regard to the children.
8.

He understands that from the time the final decree of adoption is entered, pursuant

to Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-9 (1990, as amended), that the children will be adopted by the
petitioner and the children shall be regarded and treated in all respects as the children of the
petitioner and Catherine Wheeler.
2

9.

He understands that pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-10 (1990, as amended),

from the time the final decree of adoption is entered, the petitioner and the children shall sustain
the legal relationship of parent and child and have all the rights and be subject to all the duties
of that relationship.
10.

He has had the opportunity to consult with and obtain the advice of an attorney

of his choice.
11.

He understands that pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.2 (1990, as amended),

that he is entitled to a copy of this consent.
12.

He consents to the granting of a petition for adoption and consents to the adoption

by petitioner of the children.
13.

He waives notice of pendency of these adoption proceedings pursuant to Utah

Code Ann. § 78-30-4.7(4) (1990, as amended).
14.

He has read and understands the foregoing consent to adoption, and signs it freely

and voluntarily.
15.

He states upon his oath or affirmation that all statements contained in this consent

are true and correct to the best of the knowledge of the undersigned.
DATED this fffl^ay of

\] l ( tY? h

, 1995.

Gentry G;

$UK42
whed\consent\mzn

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.2 (1990, as amended), I certify that on the
day of

'qVA/iQk

2^r

, 1995, personally appeared before me, Gentry Gamble, personally

known to me or proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the person whose name
is signed above, and I certify to the best of my information and belief that said person has read
and understood the foregoing consent and has signed it freely and voluntarily.
Where the above consent is signed by a birth mother, or the child sought to be adopted,
or other person, I certify that I am a judge of a court that has jurisdiction over adoption
proceedings, or a public officer appointed by that judge for the purpose of taking consents.
DATED this 2 L 1 day of

lV\^lC^

, 1995.

JUDGE OR JUDICIALLY APPOINTED OFFICER
In the case of persons signing the above consent other than a birth mother or an adoptee,
I sign as a notary public as follows:

NOTARY PUBLIC "

Mindy Ml/denhall

^ 525 East 100 South
Salt laka City, Utah 84102
My Commisajon Exptea
<Hity22t 1989
STATE O F UTAH

NOTARTLPUBUC

Residing at: ^[{

"

'

~

{lL\£ C'OUlHj i W

l t

u

•0G-JIC43
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ADDENDUM D

EXHIBIT
-Aiy^iTftaM"B"""'

FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt Lake County Utah

APrt 2 7 1995
Kevin J. Fife (Bar No. 5962)
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL P.C.
Attorneys for Petitioner
525 East First South, Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
Telephone (801) 532-2666
Facsimile (801) 355-1813

Ltthe CUUVJTY

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF
THE ADOPTION OF:

DECREE OF ADOPTION

TREVOR B. WHEELER GAMBLE and
BARON G. WHEELER GAMBLE,

Probate No. 952900102AD

minor children.

Judge J. Dennis Frederick

The above-entitled matter came before the court for hearing on Thursday, the 27th day
of April, 1995 at 9:00 a.m., the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick presiding, for consideration of
the petition of Daniel R. Larsen to adopt Trevor B. Wheeler Gamble ("Trevor") and Baron G.
Wheeler Gamble ("Baron"). Mr. Larsen was present in person and represented by counsel,
Kevin J. Fife.

Also present were Trevor and Baron and their natural mother, Catherine

Wheeler. The court heard and considered the testimony of Petitioner, Trevor, Baron and
Catherine Wheeler, considered the contents of the file and having heretofore made and entered
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,

0 GC G 1 7

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
1.

This court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties to this action.

2.

Because Trevor and Baron were brought into Utah by Catherine Wheeler and

Gentry Gamble, their natural parents, the Interstate Compact on Placement of Children, Utah
Code Ann. § 62A-4a-701 (1953, as amended), is not applicable to this adoption.
3.

Daniel R. Larsen is declared to have adopted Trevor and Baron and from this date

forward shall owe to them all the rights and responsibilities of a natural father to natural children
and Trevor and Baron shall owe to Daniel Larsen the responsibilities of a child to their natural
father.
4.

All rights and interests of Gentry Gamble with regard to Trevor and Baron are

hereby and forever terminated.
5.

Trevor and Baron shall continue to be known as Trevor B. Wheeler Gamble and

Baron G. Wheeler Gamble.
6.

The Clerk of this Court shall make four (4) certified copies of this Decree of

Adoption which shall be delivered to Petitioner's counsel, and then shall seal this file and not
permit examination of the file by any person or party without further order of the court.
DATED this

of April, 1995.
COURT:

I CERTIFY THATTH© tS A T O * COW O J W
ORIGINAL D O ^ E ^ W Rl£INT>«TWRO
DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE COUNTY STAlfc

whed\petition\mm
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